They’ve had a hard time of late, but our stock-picker thinks both of these shares merit attention for those with appetite for risk.
Why are oil prices rising – up to over $75 a barrel from sub-$40 last November and above pre-pandemic levels - yet oilfield services stocks are falling?
Specifically, Petrofac Ltd (LSE:PFC), which at 109p and around £400 million market cap is back to market value early last November before vaccines set stocks roaring. John Wood Group (LSE:WG.), at 217p and £1.5 billion, down 40% from levels only last January, is another example.
Yes, both companies’ narratives continue to manifest accountability regarding the Unaoil scandal and, in Petrofac’s case, other bribery allegations involving past employees.
Last March, Petrofac fell from 133p to 95p after the Abu Dhabi national oil company suspended it from competing for new awards. Yet this appears a visible reprimand to show Abu Dhabi takes the issues seriously, “until further notice” hinting at change again in due course.
It is looking like an anomaly how the market has (over) priced many stocks for recovery from the pandemic, yet remains very cautious towards oil services. This has got beyond the bribery issue.
- Stockwatch: what to do with Morrisons shares after US bid approach
- Read more Stockwatch articles here
- Check out our award-winning stocks and shares ISA
In over 20 years of following this specialist engineering sector, I have found it quite often more sensitive to oil price changes than exploration and production stocks. Demand for services can lag oil prices as project managers wait to see if oil price changes are sustained.
The market in these stocks appears to be taking a very cautious view: how the airline industry remains constrained and globally it will be years before we genuinely emerge from the pandemic.
Mixed figures imply a challenge to assert intrinsic value
Recent years’ financial overviews for both companies do make projections dicey. Wood has shown good top line progress albeit erratic profits, irrespective of last year. Petrofac’s revenues have steadily declined and profit is all over the place.
Yet the market’s caution is not shared by the consensus of brokers’ analysts which targets £185 million net profit this year and £235 million in 2022, implying sterling equivalent earnings per share (EPS) of 19p rising to 24.5p – for a price/earnings (PE) ratio of 11x easing to just 8.7x if these forecasts are realistic.
Both companies are avoiding dividends until services demand is firmly re-established, but if consensus on Wood is fair – to pay out nearly 7p a share equivalent and 11p in 2022 – then the current stock price offers a chance to lock in a near 5% yield with earnings cover over 2x.
That has a feeling of a trough, although is a big uplift compared with the more cautious view on Petrofac: to recover net profit to about $50 million in respect both of 2021 and 2022, implying EPS around 15 cents or 11p, hence a forward PE of 10x. No payout is expected until and in respect of 2022 year, paying out about half of earnings for a 5.7p equivalent, total dividend.
Low single-digit operating margins may deter exacting investors from exposure to this industry though, until an up-cycle is manifest. By then however, you would have long-missed the chart trough.
Petrofac - financial summary
Year ended 31 Dec
|Turnover - $ million||6,844||7,873||6,395||5,829||5,530||4,081|
|Operating margin - %||-3.7||2.4||1.6||2.7||4.0||-3.6|
|Operating profit - $m||-252||186||104||159||220||-148|
|Net profit - $m||-349||1.0||-29||64.0||73.0||-180|
|Return on capital - %||-6.9||5.8||4.0||7.9||10.7||-17.1|
|Reported EPS - cents||-103||0.3||-8.5||18.6||21.3||-53.4|
|Normalised EPS - c||-62.9||84.3||124||128||59.5||-4.2|
|Operating cash flow/share - c||197||190||124||140||69.4||-4.8|
|Capital expenditure/share - c||49.7||48.1||34.4||28.4||29.4||17.8|
|Free cash flow/share - c||147||142||89.7||112||39.9||-22.6|
|Dividend/share - c||65.8||63.0||12.7||37.0||0.0||0.0|
|Earnings cover - x||-1.6||0.0||-0.7||0.5||0.0||0.0|
|Cash - $m||1,559||1,167||967||726||1,025||684|
|Net debt - $m||1,101||1,213||1,159||361||423||429|
|Net assets/share - c||356||317||268||210||183||125|
Source: histroric company REFS and company accounts
Wood’s narrative implies a firmer trajectory of the two
The default forward indicator for such engineering services groups as Wood Group is their “backlog” i.e. order book, which is typically seen as the crux leading indicator.
In a 24 June update for its first half year, Wood cited revenue down around 21% due to Covid’s impact; yet a $6.9 billion backlog is up 6% on December 2020. “Following a steady start in the first quarter, we have seen improving momentum in activity in the second…expect to deliver strong like-for-like margin improvement…order book up 6%...confidence of a return to growth in the second half.”
It was somewhat incongruous how the stock continued to drift down, given fundamentals look to be passing a turning point. While consensus projections appear bullish, improving margins as well as sales can easily bump up profits at a substantive group like Wood.
Wood Group - financial summary
Year end 31 Dec
|Turnover - $ million||5,001||4,121||5,394||10,014||9,890||7,564|
|Operating margin - %||3.2||2.2||0.5||1.7||3.1||-0.4|
|Operating profit - $m||159||89.4||27.9||165||303||-32.9|
|Net profit - $m||79.0||27.8||-32.4||-8.9||72.0||-229|
|Return on capital - %||5.0||3.0||0.3||2.1||4.1||0.5|
|Reported EPS - cents||17.3||7.3||-7.4||-1.3||10.5||-34.1|
|Normalised EPS - c||67.5||51.3||38.7||28.7||22.2||-0.3|
|Operating cash flow/share - c||123||49.5||34.2||80.9||96.4||45.1|
|Capital expenditure/share - c||21.8||22.7||18.0||13.8||21.3||13.1|
|Free cash flow/share - c||101||26.8||16.2||67.1||75.0||31.9|
|ordinary dividend/share - c||30.3||10.8||34.0||34.5||0.0||0.0|
|Covered by earnings - x||0.6||0.7||-0.2||0.0||0.0||0.0|
|Cash - $m||851||580||1,257||1,353||1,857||585|
|Net debt - $m||320||349||1,641||1,559||2,052||1,568|
|Net assets/share - c||633||576||732||674||645||606|
Source: histroric company REFS and company accounts
Yesterday, the stock eased further despite a market update about resolution of historic bribery issues to obtain contracts within the Amec Foster Wheeler companies, acquired in 2017. A total £128 million equivalent will be paid over the next three years.
It was hardly as if this came as any surprise, and normally such clarification clears the air so investors can look forward. Instead, the price fell, as if in jaundice.
Petrofac’s backlog appears relatively harder hit
Yesterday’s update in respect of its first-half year cited the backlog down 20% to $4 billion, due to the UAE suspension but also “as clients continue to defer awards in other markets”. Secured revenue for 2021 comprises $3 billion so far, relative to $5.5 billion achieved in 2019.
More positively, Petrofac says it is on course for $250 million cost savings which ought to help margins in the medium term.
New orders are likely to remain depressed this year on the engineering and construction side, with management saying: “The recovery in oil prices has yet to manifest itself in a significant expansion in capital spending by our clients.” This is sweetened with the claim of “an active bidding pipeline of $48 billion opportunities due for award in the next 18 months”.
Cynics may say that is jam tomorrow. Petrofac’s long-term chart has been in persistent if jagged decline from £17 in March 2012. But even in a worse-case scenario of the Serious Fraud Office finding dirt on the CEO of nearly 20 years, who retired at the end of 2020, the group has broken managerially with its past and retains strong market positions.
Petrofac is becoming quite a takeover candidate
Once regulators finally clear the air, like they have just done for Wood, it could be opportune to offer a decent premium to market value before oil prices prompt recovery in demand for services. Its market value is currently less than a third of Wood’s, hence less of a financial hurdle and easier to integrate.
Enough weary shareholders might capitulate although the ex-CEO’s family does own nearly 19%. Toscafund, an enterprising hedge fund, owns 5%. This accords with a contrarian investment case, plus takeover potential.
I am quite a stale bull on Petrofac having had a broadly positive view in recent years and suggesting it as a ‘buy’ last January similarly at 109p.
- Discover how to be a better investor here
- Subscribe to the ii YouTube channel to watch all our latest interviews
As of the end of 2020, net tangible assets per share were 54p equivalent but arguably a service business merits some extent of goodwill/intangibles recognition, where overall net asset value (NAV) was 127p a share. It is not a stretch to say the stock is broadly around book value; another plus for takeover at what looks a cyclical trough for revenue/profit.
Realise also, two other hedge funds marginally raised their short positions a few days ago, implying they anticipate a swingeing SFO fine plus further revenue erosion.
The overall short position has however plunged from about 9% last April to 2.6% and Morrisons (MRW) had about 3.5% of its stock shorted before a bid approach. Wood is similarly on 3.5% with two funds increasing and two reducing their shorts.
Higher-risk ‘buys’ yet potentially higher rewards
A trough on charts will only become apparent in hindsight, but I think both stocks merit attention, according to your risk preference. Wood has at least had its situation cleared up by the SFO, yet there are also contrarian reasons to accumulate Petrofac. Buy.
Edmond Jackson is a freelance contributor and not a direct employee of interactive investor.
These articles are provided for information purposes only. Occasionally, an opinion about whether to buy or sell a specific investment may be provided by third parties. The content is not intended to be a personal recommendation to buy or sell any financial instrument or product, or to adopt any investment strategy as it is not provided based on an assessment of your investing knowledge and experience, your financial situation or your investment objectives. The value of your investments, and the income derived from them, may go down as well as up. You may not get back all the money that you invest. The investments referred to in this article may not be suitable for all investors, and if in doubt, an investor should seek advice from a qualified investment adviser.
Full performance can be found on the company or index summary page on the interactive investor website. Simply click on the company's or index name highlighted in the article.
We use a combination of fundamental and technical analysis in forming our view as to the valuation and prospects of an investment. Where relevant we have set out those particular matters we think are important in the above article, but further detail can be found here.
Please note that our article on this investment should not be considered to be a regular publication.
Details of all recommendations issued by ii during the previous 12-month period can be found here.
ii adheres to a strict code of conduct. Contributors may hold shares or have other interests in companies included in these portfolios, which could create a conflict of interests. Contributors intending to write about any financial instruments in which they have an interest are required to disclose such interest to ii and in the article itself. ii will at all times consider whether such interest impairs the objectivity of the recommendation.
In addition, individuals involved in the production of investment articles are subject to a personal account dealing restriction, which prevents them from placing a transaction in the specified instrument(s) for a period before and for five working days after such publication. This is to avoid personal interests conflicting with the interests of the recipients of those investment articles.